ANTI-CONCURRENT CAUSATION
CLAUSES IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS:
THE STATE OF THE LAW IN 2017
Joshua T. Carback*
Few aspects of insurance law are more provocative than the anti-concurrent causation clauses (“ACCs”). In circumstances where an insured
suffers a loss concurrently caused by both covered and uncovered perils,
an ACC bars recovery.1 If ACCs are unenforceable in the jurisdiction,
however, the insured can recover.2 Insurers benefit from ACCs to the detriment of insureds because their coverage obligations are significantly reduced in scenarios involving concurrently caused losses. Some support
ACCs as an acceptable exercise of the freedom to contract, while others
deem them a repulsive manifestation of the power asymmetry between
insurers and insureds in drafting policies. This Essay assesses the state of
the law with respect to the enforceability of ACCs. Part I provides an
overview of insurance causation concepts.3 Part II surveys the state of the
law.4 Part III explores the normative dimensions of the debate over ACC
enforceability.5 Part IV concludes.6
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1 Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Anticoncurrent Causation (ACC) Clauses in Insurance Policies, 37 A.L.R. 6th 657 (2008).
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See infra Part IV.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF CAUSATION IN INSURANCE LAW
There are three essential questions in any legal inquiry as to whether
an insured’s loss is covered by their policy.7 First, “[h]ow did the loss happen?”8 Second, “[i]f multiple forms of insurance are in effect, which if any
cover the loss?”9 Third, “[i]f there is more than one cause of the loss, is
there any coverage?”10 ACC enforceability is a legal issue often implicated
in answering the third question. This Part offers a preliminary overview of
causation concepts in insurance law that are critical to unpacking the ACC
enforceability issue. Section A of this Part defines important insurance law
terminology.11 Section B outlines the form and function of ACCs in insurance contracts.12
A. Insurance Contract Terminology
Randall L. Smith and Fred A. Simpson’s Causation in Insurance Law
provides a helpful guide to insurance law terminology.13 First, a “peril” is
an “active physical force that brings about a loss.”14 “Named-Perils
Polic[ies]” are policies that cover listed perils, whereas “All-Risks Insurance Polic[ies]” cover all risks of accidental loss to a property except those
that are specifically excluded in the policy.15 “Causation” consists of the
connection between a peril (e.g., a mudslide) and damages that may be covered by an insurance policy.16
Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 305,
306 (2006).

7

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11See

infra Part I.A.

12

See infra Part II.B.

13

Smith & Simpson, supra note 7, at 312–13.

Id. (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 632 n.13 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004)).

14

Id. at 313; see JEFFREY JACKSON & D. JASON CHILDRESS, MISS. INS. LAW AND PRAC. §
15:17 (West 2016).

15

16

Smith & Simpson, supra note 7, at 313.
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Two of the most common insurance policies are first-party property
policies and liability insurance policies: the former covers losses produced
by perils to an insured’s property or person, while the latter “provides protection against a broad range of liability claims.”17 While determining if a
loss is covered by a specific peril is a relatively simple inquiry, scenarios
where there are multiple causes are more complex. American jurisdictions
take different approaches towards causation in insurance law, as will be
explored below.
B. Form and Function of Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses
There are three approaches to insurance causation. First, some jurisdictions follow the concurrent causation doctrine.18 This doctrine is a proinsured approach because it requires coverage in situations where there
are multiple perils concurrently causing a loss and only a minority—even
one of those perils—is covered by the policy.19 Second, some jurisdictions
follow the efficient proximate cause (“EPC”) doctrine, also known as the
dominant cause approach.20 Under this paradigm, courts determine which
among concurrent causes of a loss was the most substantial or responsible:
if the EPC (i.e., the most substantial) is covered, the insured receives damages.21 Finally, some jurisdictions apply the apportionment approach.22
The apportionment approach requires segregation of losses incurred by
covered perils from losses caused by uncovered perils, tracking traditional

TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 133, 306 (3d ed. 2013); Smith & Simpson, supra note 7, at 311.
17

18 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 132 (Cal. 1973) (“Although there may be some question whether either of the two causes in the instant case
can be properly characterized as the “prime,” “moving” or “efficient” cause of the accident we believe that coverage under a liability insurance policy is equally available to an
insured whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the
injuries.”) (footnotes omitted).

Mark M. Bell, A Concurrent Mess and a Call for Clarity in First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 73, 76 (2011) (footnote omitted).
19

20Id.

at 79; e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 314 (Ala. 1999).

21

Bell, supra note 19, at 79 (footnote omitted).

22

Id. at 80.
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tort apportionment doctrine.23 There are two species of this approach:
pure apportionment and modified comparative apportionment.24 If a
court follows the pure apportionment model, an insured receives the percentage of damages caused by the covered peril; if the court follows the
modified apportionment model, they only receive a percentage of damages
correlated to a covered peril if it is the EPC.25
Insurers attempt to contract out of the EPC doctrine using ACCs.26
A model ACC provides as follows: “We do not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded event; or b) other causes of the
loss; or c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with
the excluded event to produce the loss.”27 ACCs work to the advantage of
insurers, as is expressed in the following example of a scenario taking place
in an EPC jurisdiction.28 An insured contracts into an all-risk homeowner’s
policy that covers losses caused by wind, lightning, and hail.29 The policy
also contains an ACC and a water damage exclusion.30 Weeks later, hurricane winds cause a levy to breach; flooding subsequently decimates the
home. In this situation, the ACC operates in tandem with the water damage exclusion to bar coverage.31 There is great division between American
jurisdictions over the enforceability of ACCs, as will be explored in Part
II below.32

23

Id. (footnote omitted).

24

Id.

25

Id.

26ANDREW

B. DOWNS & LINDA M. BOLDUAN, LAW
LITIG. § 52:9 (West 2016).

27

AND

PRAC.

OF INS.

COVERAGE

Id.

28See

Howard A. Van Dine III & Erik T. Norton, Anti-Concurrent Causation Clauses and
Hurricane Relief: Was it Wind or Water?, S.C. LAWYER, Jan. 19, 2008, at 19–20.

29Id.

at 19.

30Id.
31

See id. at 19–20.

32

See id. at 23.
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II. ACC ENFORCEABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part surveys the state of the law with respect to the enforceability
of ACCs in insurance contracts across the United States. For simplicity’s
sake, this Essay will use a traffic light system to break down the jurisdictional divide. Insurance is chiefly regulated at the state level; therefore,
state case law primarily expresses a given jurisdiction’s position on ACC
enforceability.33 When ACC enforceability disputes meet diversity and
amount-in-controversy requirements, however, parties can remove to federal jurisdiction.34 Part A will review green light jurisdictions—those in
which the court of last resort explicitly ruled that ACCs are enforceable.35
Part B discusses red light jurisdictions in which the court of last resort
explicitly ruled that ACCs are not enforceable.36 Part C addresses yellow
light jurisdictions where the court of last resort has not addressed the issue,
but lower state courts and/or federal courts are either discordant or generally favor one position (i.e., enforceability/unenforceability).37
A. Green Light Jurisdictions that Favor ACC Enforceability
The majority of jurisdictions with a clear position, fourteen total, that
have determined that ACCs are unequivocally enforceable include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.38 The Alabama Supreme Court’s
33 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945) (“Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and
that silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several states.”).
34

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012).

35

See infra Part II.A.

36

See infra Part II.B.

37

See infra Part II.C.

Stankova v. Metro. Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 788 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying Arizona
law); State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure, Inc., 823 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying
Minnesota law); Preferred Mut. Inc. Co. v. Travelers Co., 127 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 1997)
(applying Massachusetts law); Katopothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14380, 2016 WL 5374081, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2016) (applying District of Columbia
law); Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.12–00534–N, 2013 WL 4607548, at *1
(S.D. Ala., August 29, 2013) (applying Alabama law); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meggison,
38
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decision in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade presents an illustrative example.39 In Slade, insureds built a home. Insureds’ neighbors removed considerable amounts of soil in building a home adjacent to theirs.40 The soil
removal created a drop off requiring insureds to construct a retaining wall
on their property to prevent soil erosion on their land.41 The retaining wall
collapsed when it was struck by lightning during a severe storm, causing
the insureds’ backyard pool to collapse.42 Insureds investigated the damage
and learned that visible cracks in the ceilings, interior walls, and exterior
walls of their home were caused by soil shifting on their land.43 The destruction of the retaining wall by the lightning strike caused the soil shift,
which in turn caused the foundation of insureds’ home to move.44 Importantly, insureds’ policy contained an earth movement exclusion and an
ACC providing:

53 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Mass. 1999) (applying Massachusetts law); Probuilders Specialty
Ins. Co. v. Double M. Constr., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1173 (D. Nev. 2015) (applying Nevada
law); Schroeder v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F. Supp. 558, 561 (D. Nev. 1991)
(applying Nevada law); Amherst Country Club, Inc. v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co.,
561 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. N.H. 2008) (applying New Hampshire law); Ideaitalia Contemporary Furniture Corp. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 5:15-CV-00016-RLV, 2016 WL
7238818, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 2016) (applying North Carolina law); Wandler v.
Homesite Indem. Co., No. 13-CV-64-F, 2013 WL 12092300, at *1 (D. Wyo., Nov. 7,
2013) (applying Wyoming law); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 314
(Ala. 1999); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., v. Bongnen, 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1999); Kane
v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P.2d 678, 685 (Colo. 1989); Thompson v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 165 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2007); Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780
A.2d 1123 (D.C. 2001); Amish Connection, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 861
N.W.2d 230 (Iowa 2015); Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346 (Mass. 2012); Powell
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 252 P.3d 668 (Nev. 2011); Bates v. Phenix
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 156 N.H. 719, 943 A.2d 750 (N.H. 2008); Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Glascarr Prop., Inc., 202 N.C. Ct. App. 323, 688 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); South
Carolina Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Durham, 380 S.C. 506, 671 S.E.2d 610 (S.C. 2009);
JAW The Pointe, L.L.C., v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 597, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 690
(Tex. 2015); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 769 (Wyo. 1988).
39

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 293 (Ala. 1999).

40

Id. at 297.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 297–98.

43

Id. at 298.

44

Id.
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We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the
excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether
other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs
suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage,
arises from natural or external forces, or occurs as the result of
any combination of these. . . .45
Insureds argued on appeal that the earth movement exclusion was 1) ambiguous, 2) contrary to reasonable expectations, and 3) arguendo that the
ACC was unenforceable because it violated the EPC doctrine controlling
in Alabama.46
The Court found for insurer and held that ACCs are enforceable in
Alabama.47 The Court first determined that the contract unambiguously
excluded earth movement: the plain meaning of the language unequivocally excluded the soil shift.48 Second, the Court noted that some jurisdictions do not even consider a reasonable expectations doctrine argument
unless a contract is ambiguous to begin with.49 The reasonable expectations doctrine provides that when policies “containing provisions reasonably subject to different constructions, one favorable to the insurer and
one favorable to the insured,” the construction favoring the insured prevails.”50 Notwithstanding that observation, the Court held that the insureds could not reasonably expect coverage because the contract unambiguously excluded losses caused by earth movement.51 Finally, the Court
noted its decision in Western Assurance Co. v. Hann where it recognized the
EPC doctrine.52 The Court held that enforcing the ACC did not violate
45

Id. at 298–99.

46

Id. at 311–13.

47See
48

id. at 314.

Id. at 310.

Id. at 312 (citing Rodriguez v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Mo. 1991) and
Riffe v. Home Finders Assocs., Inc., 517 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1999)).
49

50

Id. at 311 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Chapman, 200 So. 425, 426–27 (1941)).

51Id.

at 312.

52Id.

at 313 (citing 78 So. 232 (1917)).
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public policy.53 The Court’s justification for its result was its long established preference to avoid rewriting unambiguous insurance policies.54
This case illustrates the rationale typically underlying ACC enforceability:
respect for the freedom of contract by enforcing unambiguous policies.55
Texas is the most recent jurisdiction to acquire the green light designation, endorsing ACCs as enforceable in JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co. in 2015.56 In JAW The Pointe, insured bought an apartment
complex that was later damaged by wind and flooding during a hurricane.57
Compliance with city ordinances required repairs, which imposed additional costs.58 Insured had purchased several policies offering multiple layers of coverage, the primary layer being provided by the defendant.59 The
insurer refused coverage on the basis that the policy contained a flooding
exclusion, a repair in compliance with ordinance or law exclusion, and an
ACC clause.60 The Texas Supreme Court noted that ACCs are widely accepted as enforceable in jurisdictions within the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.61 The Court followed the Fifth Circuit trend
in holding that in the case at bar, the ACC and exclusions operated to
preclude coverage of the losses sustained by the insured for damages concurrently inflicted on its property by wind and water.62

53

Id. at 314.

54

Id.

See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 436 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Slade, 747 So.2d 293).

55

460 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2015); JOHN K. DIMUGNO ET AL., CATASTROPHE CLAIMS:
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS § 4:16 (West 2016).

56

57

JAW The Pointe, L.L.C., 460 S.W.3d at 599–600.

58

Id. at 600.

59

Id.

Id. at 602. The policy stated, in pertinent part: “We will not pay for the loss or damage
caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently in any sequent to the
loss. a. Ordinance or Law. . . . g. Water 1) Flood. . . .”. Id. at 604.

60

61

Id. at 607–08.

62

Id. at 610.
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B. Red Light Jurisdictions Prohibiting Enforcement of ACCs
The minority of jurisdictions with clear positions, four total, prohibit
enforcement of ACCs.63 Subsection 1 addresses two jurisdictions that statutorily prohibit ACC enforceability: California and North Dakota.64 Subsection 2 explores two jurisdictions where prohibitions of ACC enforcement are judge made: Washington and West Virginia.65
1. Red Light Jurisdictions Statutorily Prohibiting ACC
Enforcement
In Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., the California Supreme Court
held that enforcement of ACCs was inconsistent with public policy as expressed in the California Insurance Code.66 In Garvey, insureds bought an
all-risk homeowner’s policy from State Farm, their insurer.67 The policy
contained an ACC and an exclusion for earth movement.68 The insureds
later sued their insurer when the insurer refused coverage for damage to
their home concurrently caused by earth movement and contractor negligence.69
The Court held in favor of insureds.70 Section 530 of the California
Insurance Code provides that insurers are liable for proximately caused
losses not contemplated by insurance contracts.71 Section 532 provides
that “if a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance and there is
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, (Cal. 1989); Sabella v. Wisler, 59
Cal. 2d 21 (Cal. 1963); W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of North Dakota, 643 N.W.2d 4,
14 (N.D. 2002); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989) (en banc);
Villella v. Pub. Emp. Mut. Ins. Co., 725 P.2d 957 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); Murray v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1, 14 (W.Va. 1998); Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
63

64

See infra Part II.B.1.

65

See infra Part II.B.2.

66

48 Cal. 3d 395, 403 (1989).

67

Id. at 399.

68

Id. at 399–400.

69

Id. at 400.

70

See id. at 412–13.

71

CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1935).

30

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

a loss which would not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is
thereby excepted even though the immediate cause of the loss was a peril
which was not excepted.”72 The Court noted its decision in Sabella v. Wisler,
where it harmonized its reading of Sections 530 and 532 in determining
that insurance companies are liable for losses pursuant to the EPC doctrine.73 In accordance with its decision in Sabella, the Court held that if a
jury determines on remand that the earth movement was the EPC of insureds’ loss, then insurer would have to provide coverage notwithstanding
the ACC and exclusion in the contract.74 The North Dakota Supreme
Court paralleled the Garvey court’s analysis in holding that ACCs are unenforceable pursuant to the statutory embodiment of the EPC doctrine in
W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of North Dakota.75
2. Red Light Jurisdictions Where Judge-Made Law Bars ACC
Enforceability
The high appellate courts of Washington and West Virginia prohibit
ACCs notwithstanding the fact that the legislatures of those states are silent on the issue. In Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann, insureds possessed an allrisk homeowner’s policy excluding damage from landslides.76 The insurer
attempted to contract out of the EPC doctrine by including an ACC with
exclusions in the policy that provided: “We do not cover loss caused by
any of the following excluded perils, whether occurring alone or in any
sequence with a covered peril. . . . 2. Earth Movement, meaning: a. earthquake; landslide; mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting.”77 The insureds

72

CAL. INS. CODE § 532 (West 1935).

73

Garvey, 770 P.2d 704, 707 (Cal. 1989) (citing Sabella, 59 Cal. 2d at 31–34).

74

Id. at 412–13.

W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d at 15–26 (analogizing to Garvey in interpreting N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 26.1-32-01, 26.1-32-03 (West 1985) as voiding the ACC and exclusions in the disputed insurance contract).

75

76

Safeco, 773 P.2d at 413.

77

Id. at 414.
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home was destroyed when severe winds, heavy rain, and a hill slide concurrently caused the home to shift from its foundation.78
The court held for insureds. The court noted that it adopted the EPC
doctrine in Graham v. Public Emp. Mut. Ins. Co.79 The court relied on its
prior decision in Villella v. Pub. Emp. Mut. Ins. Co., where it held that an
insurer could not contract out of EPC doctrine.80 In noting the nearly
identical language of the policy at bar and that in Villela, the Safeco court
concluded “If the initial event, the ‘efficient proximate cause,’ is a covered
peril, then there is coverage under the policy regardless whether subsequent events within the chain, which may be causes-in-fact of the loss, are
excluded by the policy.”81
Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court prohibited ACCs—despite the lack of a statutory basis for doing so—in Murray v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co.82 In Murray, insureds home was damaged by boulders and rocks
that fell off of a high wall. Insureds sued insurer when they were denied
coverage because their loss was partially due to a landslide, a concurrent
cause excluded in tandem with an ACC in their policy.83 The court
grounded its reasoning in the reasonable expectations doctrine rejected by
the Alabama Supreme Court in Slade.84 The consensus of the minority of
red light jurisdictions is the converse of that of the green light jurisdictions:
the fairness concern that inheres in the reasonable expectations argument
is given more weight than the freedom to contract principle.

78

Id. (emphasis added).

79

79. 656 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Wash. 1983).

80

725 P.2d 957, 964 (Wash. 1986).

81

Safeco, 773 P.2d at 416.

82

509 S.E.2d 1, 15 (W.Va. 1998).

83

Id. at 6.

Id. at 14 (“Insureds with all-risks insurance likely have heightened expectations because
of the comprehensive nature of the coverage and the greater premium rates. These expectations would not often be given effect if recovery was denied whenever an exception
or exclusion contributed to the loss.” (citing R. Fierce, Insurance Law-Concurrent Causation:
Examination of Alternative Approaches, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 544 (1986)).
84
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C. Yellow Light Jurisdictions Generally Support Enforcement of ACCs
A sizeable number of jurisdictions, thirty total, do not have a clear
rule of law on ACC enforceability. These include Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Virginia.85 Lower state courts in yellow light jurisdictions

See TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1997)
(applying Missouri law); Front Row Theater, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 F.3d
1343, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Ohio law); Iroquois on the Beach, Inc. v. Gen. Star
Indem. Co., 550 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying Michigan law); In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 223 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Louisiana law); Tuepker v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Mississippi law);
Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007); Cent. Michigan Cmty.
Hosp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 06-10220-BC, 2007 WL 473014, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6,
2007); Paulucci v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2002);
Empire Indem. Ins. Co. v. Winsett, No. 4:06cv439-SPM/WCS, 2008 WL 919824, at *1
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2008); Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Imperial Plaza v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 939 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D. Hawaii 2013); Assurance Co. of Am., Inc. v.
Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. N.J. 1999); Ngyuen v. Atl. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 07127, 2008 WL 1884050, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 2008); Cameron Par. Sch. Bd. v. RSUI
Indem. Co., 620 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. La. 2008); Bao v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 535
F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D. Md. 2008); Winters v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d
1288 (D. N.M. 1998); Ideaitalia Contemporary Furniture Corp. v. Selective Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 5:15-CV-00016-RLV DSC, 2016 WL 7238818, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 14,
2016); Kelly v. Farmers Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 2003); York v.
Liberty. Mut. Grp., Inc., No. 09–113–HA, 2010 WL 275653, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2010);
Swenson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 891 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1109–10 (D. S.D. 2012);
Hardy & Kelly, LLC v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 3–11–0155, 2012 WL 1744670, at *7 (M.D.
Tenn., May 16, 2012); St. Mary’s Area Water Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
472 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2007); T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. Charles Boyer Children’s
Tr., 455 F. Supp. 2d 284, 289 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Lombardi v. Universal N. Am. Ins. Co.,
No. NNHCV136036542S, 2015 WL 600823, at **24–25 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2015)
(unpublished); Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Chateau La Mer II Homeowners Ass’n, 622 So. 2d 1105, 1108 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Bozek v. Erie Ins. Grp., 46 N.E.3d 362, ¶ 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015);
Ramirez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. App. Ct 1995); Robichaux
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 81 So. 3d 1030, ¶ 15 (Miss. 2012); Kula v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 212 A.2d 16, 19–20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Glascarr Prop’s., Inc. 688 S.E.2d 508, 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Shirey v. Tri-State Ins.
Co., 274 P.2d 386, ¶ 8 (Okla. 1954); Duensing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 P.3d
127, ¶ 18 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005); Mailhiot v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 740 A.2d
360, 361 (Vt. 1999); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 793 N.W.2d 111, ¶ 24 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2010). But see Estate of Konell v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:10–cv–
955–ST, 2013 WL 3791141, at *6 (D. Or. July 19, 2013) (unreported) (following the reasoning of Washington courts in holding an ACC unenforceable). Case law addressing the
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generally favor enforcement. The recent decision by the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Second District in Bozek v. Erie Ins. Grp. serves as a prime
example.86 In Bozek, insureds incurred damage to their swimming pool following a storm: the failed pressure valve to the pool and hydrostatic pressure concurrently caused the loss.87 The insurer denied coverage under insureds’ homeowner’s policy because it contained a water damage exclusion
and an ACC.88 The court held for the insurer and, in doing so, rejected
insureds’ public policy argument on the basis that it was insufficiently
briefed.89 The court underscored the narrowness of its decision because it
is not resolved as a matter of law whether Illinois applies the EPC doctrine
when adjudicating insurance causation disputes.90
Federal courts making “Erie Guesses”91 in jurisdictions without controlling state precedents generally favor ACC enforceability. The jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit uniquely
illustrates percolation of case law addressing ACC enforceability due to
the frequency of insurance claims disputes arising from hurricane inflicted
property damage in that jurisdiction.92 In Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
insureds purchased a homeowner’s policy.93 Hurricane Katrina battered
the coast of Mississippi where insureds lived; the storm caused a tidal surge
enforceability of ACCs in insurance contracts has not percolated significantly in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
86

Bozek, 46 N.E.3d 362 at 1.

87

Id. at 6, 26.

88

Id. at 8.

89

Id. at 35.

90

Id.

The term “Erie guess” refers to when a federal court applies state law pursuant to Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In circumstances where a state’s highest court
has not ruled on the issue at bar, federal courts “guess” at what the state’s highest court
would decide if it had considered the very issue at bar, and may look to the decisions of
lower state courts in performing that analysis. E.g., Howe ex rel. Howe v. Scottsdale Ins.
Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Krieser v. Hobbs, 16 6 F.3d 736, 738 (5th
Cir. 1999) and Matheny v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1998)).
91

92 See Craig A. Cohen & Mark H. Rosenberg, After the Storm: Courts Grapple with the Insurance
Coverage Issue Resulting from Hurricane Katrina, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 139 (2008).
93

Leonard, 499 F.3d at 424 (5th Cir. 2007).
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that flooded insureds’ home.94 The policy was an all-risk policy containing
a water damage exclusion and an ACC that read, “We do not cover loss
to any property resulting directly or indirectly from any of the following.
Such a loss is excluded even if another peril or event contributed concurrently or in any sequence to cause the loss. . . .”.95 Insurer denied coverage;
insureds sued for damages.
In writing for the majority, former Chief Judge Edith H. Jones first
observed that Mississippi follows the EPC doctrine.96 While the Mississippi high appellate court had not addressed the ACC enforceability issue,
federal district courts and lower state courts in Mississippi historically upheld the enforceability of ACCs on the basis that unambiguous contracts
should be “enforced as written.”97 The court also noted that no Mississippi
statute prohibits insurers from contracting out of the EPC doctrine, like
statutes in California and North Dakota have done.98 The court determined that 1) Mississippi caselaw has not prohibited ACC enforceability,
2) Mississippi statutes do not prohibit the same, and 3) public policy supports enforcing unambiguous contracts freely entered into.99 Consequently, the court found for the insurer and denied coverage.100
III. ANALYSIS OF ACC ENFORCEABILITY IN AMERICAN INSURANCE
LAW
The jurisdictional divide over the enforceability of ACC provisions in
insurance contracts has important ramifications for the insurance industry
and the legal system. Section A assesses the normative debate over

94

Id.

95

Id. at 425 (emphasis omitted).

Id. at 431 (citing Evana Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 58 So. 2d 797, 798 (Miss.
1952)).

96

97

Id. at 433 & n. 8 (citing Am. Bankers’ Ins. Co. v. White, 158 So. 346, 349 (Miss. 1935)).

98

Id. at 435; see supra Part II.B.1.

99

Leonard, 499 F.3d at 436.

100

Id.
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101

whether ACCs should be enforced. Section B provides recommendations to insurance professionals, legislators, and judges predicated upon
the normative conclusions asserted in the previous Section.102
‘
A. ACCs Should Be Enforced
Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, the freedom
of contract is an essential pillar undergirding American contract law.103
Most state constitutions explicitly safeguard this freedom.104 The aim of
contract law, after all, is to fulfill—not desert—the expectations of parties.105 The policy debate implicated in the issue of whether the judiciary
should intervene to bar enforcement of ACCs is similar to that discussed
in Lochner v. New York.106 That is, to what extent should the judiciary alter
the common law distribution of entitlements and wealth?107 In other
words, how should the interest in preserving individual liberty by honoring
contracts freely entered into to be balanced against fairness and equity
concerns stemming from the fact insureds often do not read the fine print
of their policies?
While insurance contracts are technical and rarely accepted with a
lawyer “at the insured’s elbow,”108 insurers should nevertheless be allowed
101

See infra Part III.A.

102

See infra Part III.B.

103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
104 GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16B AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 641 (West 2d ed.
2017) (citing cases).
105 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, 21 TENN. PRAC. CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:4 (2016)
(citing Miller v. Tawil, 165 F. Supp. 2d 487 (S.D. N.Y. 2001)).
106

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 917 (1987) (“The Lochner
Court required government neutrality and was skeptical of government “intervention”;
it defined both notions in terms of whether the state had threatened to alter the common
law distribution of entitlements and wealth, which was taken to be a part of nature rather
than a legal construct. . . . Cases distinguishing between “positive” and “negative” rights
are built on Lochner-like premises that take the common law as the baseline for decision.”).
107

108 See Chase, 780 A.2d at 1123 (“The phraseology of contracts of insurance is that chosen
by the insurer and the contract in fixed form is tendered to the prospective policyholder
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to contract out of the EPC doctrine. ACCs should generally be enforceable. The fundamental protection of insureds against abuses by the insurer
in the drafting of the contract is the doctrine of contra preforentem: in the
event that there are ambiguities in a policy, those ambiguities are construed
in favor of the reasonable expectations of the insured against the insurer.109
The doctrine of contra preforentem is a sufficient safeguard for ensuring that
Aristotelian notions of equity are observed in insurance contract disputes.110 Neither legislative prohibitions of ACCs nor judicial activism generating such prohibitions are justified because they run afoul of the freedom of contract insurers and insureds enjoy. Unambiguous language in
policies containing ACCs presents sufficient warning to both parties as to
what policies do and do not cover.111 As former Chief Justice Keith Callow’s dissenting opinion in Safeco Ins. Co. v. Hirschmann demonstrated, barring enforcement of ACCs actually upsets a proper balance of policy interests by effectively “depriv[ing] insurers of the right to contract for
coverage excluding specific risks.”112 Perhaps jurisdictions uniquely susceptible to frequent natural catastrophes should promulgate ACC prohibitions predicated on dire public policy interests. Generally, however, respecting the freedom to contract should be the teleological focal point in
any causation inquiry before a court; enforcing ACCs should be the rule,
not the exception.113
who is often without technical training, and who rarely accepts it with a lawyer at his
elbow.” (citing Pa. Indem. Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and
Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S. 80, 84, (1934)).
109

Id. (citing Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 32, 35 (D.C. 1996)).

See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1137(b)20–1137(b)24 (Lesley Brown ed., David Ross trans. 2006) (c. 384–322 B.C.) (defining equity as the willingness to accommodate exigencies not contemplated in general rules).

110

111See

Chase, 780 A.2d at 1132 (“Nor can we say that [Insurer] owed [Insured] a greater
duty of disclosure or warning than the duty it fulfilled by using clear and unambiguous
language in drafting the exclusionary provision in the policy.”).

112See

Safeco., 773 P.2d at 413 (Callow J., dissenting).

Cf. MEIXIAN SONG, CAUSATION IN INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW 68 (2014) (“The
freedom of contract is the root of the policy. Ambiguity may exist where the wording or
the definition of the excluded perils is unclear. However, whether the underwriter is liable
in the event of concurrent cause with one excluded is not ambiguous. When the parties’
intention is clear and explicit, the courts should respect and comply with it.”).

113
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B. Recommendations for Practitioners, Legislatures, and the Judiciary
Predicated upon the status of ACC enforceability in American insurance law as of 2017, this Section sets forth recommendations to actors in
the insurance law system. This Section addresses insurance professionals
and litigators.114 It also discusses potential responses to the issue of ACC
enforceability by legislatures and the judiciary.115
Insurance professionals and insurance law practitioners should stay
abreast of the state of the law. Public adjustors and lawyers representing
an insured should be mindful of whether the law in the controlling jurisdiction allows or bars ACC enforceability outright in reviewing insured’s
coverage and developing litigation strategy. The same applies to staff adjusters, independent adjusters, and lawyers representing insurers. The enforceability of ACCs can be successfully contested by insureds as a matter
of law in red light jurisdictions. In green light jurisdictions, insureds should
not litigate the enforceability of ACCs unless the ACC and/or exclusionary language is likely to be found ambiguous, thereby triggering the doctrine of contra preforentem. Frivolous ACC enforceability claims in green light
jurisdictions will only draw judicial ire and waste client funds. With respect
to legal teams representing insurers, policies should not be drafted to include ACCs in red light jurisdictions. In green light jurisdictions, policy
drafters should make special effort to ensure that ACCs and exclusionary
terms are unambiguous. The model in Part I provides an example of an ACC
that will likely survive judicial scrutiny.116 Attorneys should calibrate terms
to the expectations of clarity possessed by judges in the forum where insurance litigation would likely occur.
Yellow light jurisdictions where ACC enforceability is unsettled provide a more complex problem with regard to litigation strategy. Caselaw
in lower state courts and in federal courts in such jurisdictions generally
favors enforceability. In lieu of a controlling high court opinion, insurers
should seek federal jurisdiction where ACC enforceability is highly favored. Under federal law, parties contracting into a policy are citizens in
114

See infra Part III.B.1.

115

See infra Part III.B.2.

116

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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1) every state where the insured is a citizen, 2) every state where the insurer
is incorporated, and 3) every state where the insurer has a principal place
of business.117 To that end, insurers should include ACCs in policies where
parties to the contract will be considered diverse in citizenship the amount
of coverage potentially denied is expected to exceed $75,000.118 Insurers
should advise courts of state and federal precedent that favors ACC enforceability, as well as the fact that the majority of states with clear rules
of law favor ACC enforceability.
The converse recommendation applies to insureds: insureds should
avoid removal and fight to the court of last resort in the jurisdiction in
arguing that ACCs should not be enforced.119 Insureds should analogize
insurance laws in the jurisdiction to those in California and North Dakota’s insurance codes in arguing that enforcement is statutorily barred.120
If there are no analogous statues, or in the alternative, insureds should
highlight Washington and West Virginia case law finding ACCs problematic.121 They should note fairness concerns inhering in the epistemic asymmetry during the policy drafting phase between insurers and insureds. If
possible, insureds should stipulate that there be no ACC in the drafting
stage to avoid the expense of litigating ACC enforceability to begin with.
Yellow light jurisdictions should favor ACC enforceability for the reasons stated in Part III.A. Courts should not bar ACC enforceability where
there is no statutory basis to do so; it is the prerogative of the legislature
to enact such a policy.122 Insurers should emphasize separation of powers
concerns in arguing for enforceability in yellow light jurisdictions without
laws prohibiting ACCs.

117

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).

118

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).

Because federal precedent in Oregon is split, removal there may be warranted. See
supra note 86.

119

120See
121

CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 26.1-32-01, 26.1-32-03 .

See Safeco, 773 P.2d at 413 ; Murray, 509 S.E.2d at 14.

See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47–51 (James Madison) (asserting the separation of
powers principle).

122
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As stated in Part III.A., in my view, a legislated public policy against
ACC enforcement is only justifiable in jurisdictions with unusual susceptibility to natural catastrophes demanding unique social security measures.
I believe the Gulf States, specifically Louisiana, Texas, and Florida, are
circumstantially best disposed to consider such action because they are
uniquely susceptible to hurricane damage. According to the most comprehensive assessment of hurricane activity impacting the United States, on
average, seven hurricanes strike the United States every four years and two
major hurricanes hit the United States every three years.123 Forty percent
of hurricanes that hit the United States hit Florida; sixty percent of the
category four and five hurricanes that hit the United States hit Florida or
Texas.124 These statistics demonstrate the Gulf States’ susceptibility to hurricanes due to their extensive coastlines: from 1851 to 2010, nineteen
struck Texas, twenty struck Louisiana, and thirty-seven struck Florida.125
This susceptibility can be used to justify an ACC ban.
Legislatures should consider two realities related to patterns of hurricane activity. First, the number and intensity of landfalling hurricanes hitting the United States decreased significantly during the twentieth century.126
Second, despite the immense destruction of Hurricane Katrina, the 2005
season was somewhat of an outlier. The majority of the most expensive
hurricanes to hit the United States since 1851—normalized to reflect inflation in 2010 dollars as well as changes to personal wealth and coastal
count population—occurred in the early- to mid-twentieth century.127

ERIC S. BLAKE, CHRISTOPHER W. LANDSEA & ETHAN J. GIBNEY, The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (And Other Frequently
Requested Hurricane Facts), NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., 20 (2011),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/nws-nhc-6.pdf.

123

124

Id.

125

Id. at 20, 22.

126

Id. at 15.

127

Id. at 28.
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Overall hurricane activity since the two thousands increased, but exceptionally strong landfalls did not.128 The devastation of the 2017 Atlantic season in the form of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, estimated to have
inflicted more than $290 billion in damage, was also unusual.129 While
these storms are not necessarily traceable to climate change, the prospective impact of climate change on future seasons threatening Gulf State
homeowners should be taken into consideration as well.130
Gulf State legislatures should also take into consideration milder interventions as alternatives. One example is public awareness campaigns
preceding and during hurricane season (June 1 to November 30) targeting
vulnerable areas that recommend homeowners evaluate their homeowner
insurance policies closely in light of the ACC issue. Other more robust
population level interventions include preventative measures, such as rolling back laissez-faire residential zoning on flood plains.131
The best argument for banning ACCs, would, I think, conceptualize
such a measure as a “buckle-your seatbelt” regulation in light of the common scenario where flooding, wind damage, and mudflows concurrently
cause residential property damage in hurricane prone areas.132 The need is
illustrated by the fact that private homeowners insurance policies commonly do not guarantee against flood damage.133 Moreover, disagreements

128

Id. at 15.

Maggie Astor, The 2017 Hurricane Season Really Is More Intense Than Normal, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/us/hurricanes-irma-harveymaria.html.

129

See Peter Singer, Hurricanes’ Unnatural Toll, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/hurricanes-inadequate-preventivemeasures-by-peter-singer-2017-10.

130

See id. (“But the number of lives lost and the amount of damage caused reflect human
decisions. Houston’s notorious laissez-faire approach to zoning allowed houses to be
built on flood plains.”).

131

132

See id.

See Does Homeowners Insurance Cover Hurricane Damage?, ALLSTATE (May, 2016),
http://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/home-insurance/insurance-for-hurricane-damage.aspx.

133
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over the combination of flood and wind damage after hurricanes is a common source of dispute between insurers and insureds.134 These factors,
compounded by the impact of climate change on future seasons, make a
compelling case for ACC bans. Legislatures should consider, however, alternative interventions outlined previously and inquire into the economic
toll of banning ACCs. If possible, the amount of damage sustained by insureds unremediated because of ACCs should be empirically measured in
order to inform the relative merits of a ban from an economic point of
view. In the scenario where legislatures do enact such legislation, they
should seek clarity and avoid the tension evidenced in Sections 530 and
532 of the California Insurance Code noted in Garvey.135 To that end, insurance legislation intending to uphold the enforceability of exclusions in
likeness of Section 532 should also explicitly disclaim that insurers cannot
include ACCs in policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of jurisdictions with clear rules of law favor ACC enforcement, with Texas being the most recent addition to that number.136
The law remains unsettled in a number of jurisdictions.137 Courts in unsettled jurisdictions should uphold enforceability of ACCs out of respect for
the freedom of contract principle.138 Insurers and insureds should be

See Darla Mercado, Hurricane Matthew: Watch Out for These Insurance Surprises, CNBC (last
updated Oct. 6, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/06/do-you-know-ifinsurance-policy-covers-hurricane-damage.html.
134

135. See Garvey, 770 P.2d at 707 (“Our courts have long struggled to enunciate principles
that determine whether coverage exists when excluded and covered perils interact to
cause a loss. Initially, the courts attempted to reconcile section 530 (which provides for
coverage when a peril insured against was the “proximate cause” of loss) with section
532 (which provides, that “If a peril is specifically excepted in a contract of insurance,
and there is a loss which would not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is thereby
excepted [from coverage] even though the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which
was not excepted”)”.).
136

See supra Part II.A.

137

See supra Part II.C.

138

See supra Part III.A.
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mindful of this jurisdictional divide in drafting policies and litigating disputes.139 Legislatures that do favor the minority position should explicitly
articulate the unenforceability of ACCs in their insurance codes to improve judicial economy by eliminating litigation over ambiguous statutory
language.140

139

See supra Part III.B.

140

See supra Part III.B.

